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A REPLY TO MICHELMAN AND FRUG
ROBERT

C.

ELLICKSON t

No law professor has greater analytic power and intellectual
range than Frank Michelman has. In focusing on the voting-rights
section of my article, he indeed identifies an analytic error. A
national rule that commands all municipalities to confer voting
rights in a particular way prevents them from engaging in Tieboutstyle competition along that particular dimension. When municipal
competition is thus restrained, the Tiebout literature has nothing
to say about whether the value of residents' voting rights would be
reflected in land values. I thus stand corrected by Michelman's
discussion headed "[t]hird problem."
My basic concerns with the balance of Michelman's essay arise
not from the substance of his analytic arguments, but rather from
his characterization of the issue I was addressing and his interpretation of my position on that issue. Michelman operates at a highly
abstract level. In his discussion headed "[f]ifth problem," he has
us imagine the voting system we might establish when moving from
a pre-political state of nature to some form of constituted social
order. After formulating the issue in this abstract way, Michelman
can resolve it with a few ipse dixits about the virtues of universal
resident suffrage. The problem I addressed in my paper, however,
was much more concrete and particularized: in the United States
in the 1980's, where one-resident/one-vote is (rightly) the established national constitutional norm for state and federal elections,
should there be national constitutional rules that sharply limit how
substate elections can be conducted? My formulation of the problem puts two exalted principles-federalism and political egalitarianism-in direct conflict. Several of Michelman's own observations
add weight to the federalist side of the scale. If little is known
about the importance of money in politics ("[f]irst problem"), the
establishment of diverse local political laboratories might generate
useful information. Because voting power is an aspect of wealth
("[fourth problem")-a fact my article recognizes-someone who
wanted to decentralize the formulation of welfare policy might
want to allow local governments some freedom to choose among
political systems. Should egalitarianism trump federalism in the
f Paul Brest, Thomas Grey, and Mark Kelman made helpful comments on a
draft of this reply. They are in no way responsible for the final product.
(1602)
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resolution of the particular issue I posed? Perhaps, but the question is hardly as easy as Michelman makes it out.
In my article, I urged that the Supreme Court interpret the
federal constitution as requiring that municipalities be organized
according to some "plausible theory of popular government," but,
beyond that admittedly vague standard, that the Court leave the
issue of municipal political organization to state and local discretion. This was a content-neutral recommendation. To my bewilderment, Michelman (and, to a much more egregious extent,
Frug) at times interprets my article as not being content-neutral at
all, but as generally favoring the disenfranchisement of tenants in
municipal elections.' My article does include a lengthy discussion
of property qualifications for voting, and does argue that small
municipal governments should be free to choose that system. I
focused on that particular voting system for a number of obvious
reasons. Property-based voting is traditionally employed by private
governments such as homeowners associations, has been common in
public annexation and bond-issue elections, has been the system at
issue in many of the Supreme Court's voting-rights cases, and has
been of interest to scholars ranging from Aristotle to Zelenitz.
But my long discussion was not an endorsement of that particular system. Someone who believes people should be free to
practice Zoroastrianism is not necessarily a Zoroastrian himself.
Some sections of my article endorse the conferral of a community
option to choose a voting system that would reduce the current
voting power of property owners. As a state or local decisionmaker,
I would in fact have a presumption in favor of tenant voting in
municipal elections. 2
Michelman's "[s]econd problem" is that I exaggerate the homogeneity of tastes among renters. This warrants a few technical
comments. First, in Tiebout's model, which Michelman accepts
for purposes of analysis, each city attracts a self-selected group of
residents who share common interests. Michelman's example of a
municipality politically divided between "younger" and "older"
residents is consequently at odds with Tiebout's conditions. Second,
1 1 am thinking, for example, of Michelman's reference to "Ellickson's argument that renters often shouldn't be included in municipal electorates," Michelman,
Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1581-82 (1982),
and Frug's statement that "[Ellickson] argues that voting rights should be based on
property rights," Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1589, 1594 (1982).
2 See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519,
1563 n.178 (1982) (advocating that states prohibit large and medium-sized local
governments from disenfranchising tenants).
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if my characterizations of tenant interests were sometimes carelessly
monolithic, Michelman himself may have too monolithic a view of
a municipality's housing market. If the benefits of a particular
municipal program happen to be particularly accessible to occupants of a subset of a municipality's housing units, then the capitalization effects would be focused on those units.3 For example, if
Michelman's older residents were to lobby successfully for establishment of a senior citizens center in "their" neighborhood, their
political success might indeed result in higher rents in only their
neighborhood.
At a more basic level, having written an article chock full of
references to the desirability of protecting individuals' subjective
values, I was startled to learn that Michelman needs assurance that
I am not a person with syndicalist tendencies. With so many selfproclaimed enemies of liberalism tuning about these days, the defenders of liberalism needn't waste effort conjuring up imagined
ones.
Despite all this, Michelman is as impressive as always. Every
paragraph reveals that he has thought more deeply about political
organization than the rest of us have. One hungers for more,
especially for the arguments he would make in defending liberalism
against the frontal attacks being mounted by critical legal scholars. 4
Which brings me to Gerald Frug.5 Gee, I had hoped that
3 See Johnson & Lea, Differential Capitalization of Local Public Service Characteristics, 58 LAN EcoN. 189 (1982).
4

Michelman thus far has been rather gentle when criticizing the critical

theorists.

See, e.g., Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On Misdiagnosing Legal

Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1224 (1981) (comment on Tushnet).
5 The text that follows focuses on the illiberal and fuzzy nature of Frug's
utopianism. Lest my silence be misconstrued, I should also note that he and I
differ on a number of narrower issues. For example: (1) The Internal Revenue
Code's profit/nonprofit and private/public distinctions operate quite differently.
For instance, homeowners associations are typically nonprofit organizations, but
they enjoy few of the tax advantages of public entities. (2) Frug's major article
emphasized the "powerlessness" of cities, not their timidity in exercising their

powers. (3) My private taking clause would not require compensation in as many
instances as Frug suggests, and would enable associations to take certain actions

that courts currently prohibit them from taking. (4) I doubt if the conversion of
a private bank to city ownership would magically liberate the creative energies and
enhance the solidarity of the bank's workers. Does Frug really think that public-

school teachers work in a significantly more creative and supportive environment
than private-school teachers do?

On a more positive note, Frug's question about the current legal status of

Plymouth, Massachusetts, highlights an issue that I did not address in my article.
Because human foresight is imperfect, as time passes a private association's constitutional arrangements are likely to become more and more ill-suited to the land
area within its jurisdiction. As a result, state-imposed rules terminating or modifying the original private arrangements become ever more inevitable. (This same
inevitability underlies the Rule Against Perpetuities and the doctrine that covenants
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Frug would have loved my ode to pluralism.- My-article advocated
the loosening of current legal constraints. -that limit the ways -in
which small groups of people can organize. for collective existence. The kind of group I intended to help might consist of a collection
of friends who were bent on establishing a participatory democracy
(called "Solidarity") to help them develop "the capacity for com' munal self-governance across the entire existential space of life. "
But Frug didn't like my article. He filtered - its. contents
through his quite extraordinary prism on the world, and discovered
that my mission was really quite different. . Instead of being a
pluralist, I am really an agent for reactionary plutocratic forces
who seek to impose materialism, regressivity, and friendlessnessabove all, friendlessness-in every quarter. How can I respond,
except to call it a bum read and a bum rap?
Frug might have had trouble appreciating my pluralistic outlook because he himself is not a pluralist (at least on -matters. of
procedure). He believes there is a single correct road to individual
and community fulfillment. In a telling sentence, he writes: .."I
think decisions about the future will be legitimate only if based on
values generated by small-scale groups organized. as participatory
democracies." I emphasize the word "only." If. one takes him
literally, Frug apparently regards as 'illegitimate any values that a
Buddha, Kant,. or Marx might arrive at through contemplation,
reading, individual experience, or the -influence- of "large-scale"
groups. Moreover, Frug apparently regards small groups currently
organized along more hierarchical lines-for example, the family,
the small business firm, the orchestra, the football team-as illegitimate sources of values. If some friends would wanf to make use
of a somewhat hierarchical (not perfectly- participatory) structureperhaps because they thought that designating a manager responsible for central coordination and monitoring 'would enable them
may be extinguished on account of changed neighborhood conditions.)

As state-

imposed rules increasingly supplant the original private rules, the private association loses its contractual foundation. Assuming that this sort of reshaping has
occurred at Plymouth, I would not call the current Plymouth a private community.
6Frug asserts that I would force every private- association to 'adopt, or abide
by, a particular type of taking clause. Ambiguities in my exposition make me
partly responsible for his assertion. I indeed endorse the judicial or legislative
implication of a taking clause in situations where that implca.tion would not Cor-"
tradict the association's express "constitutional"' documents:. As one might have
guessed from the contractarian spirit of my article, however, I would entitle an
association, by means of an express clause- in its- constitution, -to shape its own
takings rules, or to deny takings remedies altogether.
7 Klare, The Public/Privatii Distinction, in- Labor Law, 130- U. PA. L. RE-v....
1358, 1419 (1982), quoted in Frug, supra note 1, at. 1600. -
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to deepen their friendships, play better-sounding music, score more
touchdowns, or avoid wasting too many evenings on meetings 8-in
Frug's world they would apparently be denied that organizational
option.
Frug's notion that values are legitimate only when collectively
generated is not new with him but is rather a staple of modem
critical theory. The leading critical theorist is Jfirgen Habermas.
In his respected- book on Habermas and the Frankfurt School,
Raymond Geuss states that Habermas believes that "[1]egitimizing
beliefs are acceptable only if they could have been acquired by the
agents in a free and uncoerced discussion in which all members
of the society take part." 9 Like Marx before him, Habermas regards a person not yet emancipated by this view as someone deluded by "false consciousness." 10 Habermas speaks of "the thesis
of the end of the individual." " To put it mildly, critical theory
is fundamentally at odds with liberal theory.
Frug no doubt does not agree with all that Habermas says.
And the two of them may not share the same utopian vision. This
last observation leads to my final point. Frug and the other critical
legal scholars have been unable to describe their utopian social
institutions in any detail. Like Habermas, critical legal scholars
8 The economic literature on the theory of the firm sees the emergence of
hierarchical work ar'rangements as a Pareto-superior move that helps all participants-for example, by reducing shirking by fellow workers and lowering trans-

action costs.

See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and

Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. Bsv. 777 (1972); Williamson, The Organi-

zation of Work, 1 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORIcOzqrZATION 5 (1980).
concludes:

Oliver Williamson

Rarely, I submit, will optimum job design involve the elimination of
hierarchy. Instead, it entails taking the rough edges off of hierarchy and
affording those workers who desire it a greater degree of interested involvement. But it is no accident that hierarchy is ubiquitous within all

organizations of any size.

This holds not merely within the private-for-

profit sector but among non-profits and government bureaus as well.

It

likewise holds across national boundaries and is independent of political

systems. In short, inveighing against hierarchy is rhetoric; both the logic
of efficiency and the historical evidence disclose that nonhierarchical modes

are mainly of ephemeral duration.
Id. 35. As I understand them, critical theorists regard most forms of hierarchy as
instances of illegitimate domination.
9
R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRTCAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL 62 (1981) (emphasis in original). Some liberal thinkers share this enthusiasm for the process of open conversation. See, e.g., B. AcEPufAN, SocIAl,
JUsTIcE IN THM LIBERAL STATE

(1980).

lOR. GEuss, supra note 9, at 58-68.
l1J. HABERMA s, THE LEGITmAToN Cresis 124-28 (T.' McCarthy trans. 1975).
Habermas is so consistently (and deliberately?) obscure that one cannot be sure

if he endorses this thesis as either a positive or normative proposition.
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tend to spend most of their energy proving the incoherence of prevailing ideologies, exposing the ideological, content of purportedly
.'scientific" theories, and so on. Utopian theorists, however, owe
us more than that. Lawyers, whose professional advantage lies in
knowledge of the nitty-gritty of transactional and institutional arrangements, should be particularly adept at fleshing out a utopia.
Thus a utopian lawyer at some point must do more than just announce that the intermediary institutions in his restructured society
would be "participatory democracies."
What about the details? There are issues of scale: Are family
farms too ungrouplike to serve as production units in Utopia?
How would one set up a national telephone system that would
operate without any taint of hierarchy? Issues of process: Would
presiding officers coordinate group discussions, or would that procedure be too hierarchical? If there were to be leaders, how would
they be selected and removed from office? Would decisions be
made by vote, or by consensus? If by consensus -(the answer I expect), what if no consensus were to emerge? Issues of membership:
What about children? Transients? In particular, would a disgruntled member be entitled to leave a group? Or is the utopian
world a world without dissent? Issues of coordination: Would all
groups end up honoring the same values? If not, how would divergent groups interact? Through designated leaders dealing at
arm's length? Or do the critical theorists have a participatory
vision of intergroup relations?
The United States has given birth to hundreds of utopian
communities. 12 What lessons can be drawn from those experiences?
Or do the critical legal scholars believe that they can dismiss historical data because, after the coming emancipation, people will
finally be free of the false consciousnesses that have befogged prior
utopians?13
When Frug asserts that "new possibilities for the structuring
of social life will occur to us," he admits that he currently lacks a
detailed utopian vision. As I understand them, current critical
scholars attribute their inability to design utopian institutions to
12 C. WEISBROD, TBE BoUNDAIs OF UTOPIA (1980) is an illuminating study
of legal arrangements in nineteenth century American communes. Studies by nonlawyers include H. GARDNER, THE CmLDREN OF PRosPERITY: TmRTEEN MODERN
Ammucmc COmmuNEs (1978); R. KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUmNTY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN SoCIOLOGIcAL PERsPEcTIvE (1972); C. LEWAnNE, UTOPIAS
ON PUGET SOUND

1885-1915 (1975).

13A few critical legal scholars have shown interest in past social experiments.
See, e.g., Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 695, 726-44 (1982)
(review of empirical literature on worker-controlled enterprises).
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the coercion to which they have been and continue to be subjected. 14
They (and their successors) will do better, they think, when they
become perfectly enlightened and emancipated. The audacity of
this cop-out is breathtaking. Not everyone will be converted by
proselytizers preaching romantically vague promises of salvation.
Over the centuries, Madison and numerous other realists about
human nature have helped shape for us a set of imperfect, but
functioning, institutions. If critical scholars are unable to describe
their utopian institutions, how can they be so confident that they
can do better?
14 According to Geuss, critical theorists believe that:
Our "real interests" tre those we would form in... conditions of perfect
knowledge and freedom. Although we can be in a position fully to
recognize our "real interests" only if our society satisfies the utopian condition of perfect freedom, still, although we do not live in that utopia, we
may be free enough to recognize how we might act to abolish some of
the coercion from which we suffer and move closer to "optimal conditions"
of freedom and knowledge. The task of a critical theory is to show us
which way to move.
R. GEuss, supra note 9, at 54.°

